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The Impact of the Eurozone crisis on national foreign 
policy: Enhancing Europeanisation in the case of 
Cyprus 
 
George Christou, University of Warwick 
George Kyris, University of Birmingham 
 
Abstract: This article investigates the impact of the Eurozone crisis on the foreign policy of 
an EU member state, Cyprus. Drawing on the literature on Europeanisation of national 
foreign policies, it is argued that Cypriot foreign policy, despite the general frustration 
caused by the financial crisis within broader society, has actually undergone further 
Europeanisation. We show that leadership is a critical intervening variable in this enhanced 
Europeanisation, as well as pointing to the salience of the explanatory mechanisms of social 
and instrumental learning. The contribution of the article is twofold. It offers an empirical 
account of contemporary Cypriot foreign policy and contributes to the discussion of the 
impact of the Eurozone crisis on national foreign policy. Both, we contend, remain relatively 
neglected topics in the literature.  
 
Introduction1 
The global financial crisis (2008) and the subsequent Eurozone crisis (2009) had a disruptive 
effect within and throughout the European Union (EU) and this has been well-documented 
in the literature (e.g. Caporaso and Rhodes 2016; Matthijs and Blyth 2015; Blyth 2013; 
Arestis and Sawyer 2012). In this article we seek to build on this discussion investigating 
whether the Eurozone crisis and its impact on Cyprus had consequences for foreign policy 
orientation. Preliminary evidence that the leadership in Cyprus looked at alternatives to the 
                                                          
1 The authors would like to thank the editors for their guidance, understanding and cooperation and the four 
anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments. They would also like to thank participants of The EU in 
International Affairs Conference 2014, EURO-MED and BMENA conference 2014 and UACES annual conference 
2015 for their valuable feedback on earlier versions of the paper. 
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EU to deal with the Eurozone crisis, in particular financial assistance from Russia and 
bilateral energy and commercial agreements with neighbouring states, prompts us to 
explore if and how such alternative engagement has impacted on patterns of 
Europeanisation in foreign policy.  
This focus is important given that, whilst there is an emerging literature on how the 
Eurozone crisis has impacted on domestic politics1more broadly, the area of foreign policy 
remains relatively unexplored with the exception of the critical work of Stavridis et al (2015) 
on the Mediterranean. Thus, the article contributes to the literature on the impact of the 
Eurozone crisis on the Europeanisation of foreign policy and also interrogates the hitherto 
underexplored linkage between two different but inter-related policy issues and how far 
ruptures in one (financial) can cause reorientation in another (foreign policy). Concentrating 
on foreign policy elites, this article tests the causal significance of the Eurozone crisis2 on 
practices of Europeanisation in the foreign policy realm and asks how important a factor it 
has been for reorienting foreign policy. We find that whilst issues of national interest (such 
as the Cyprus issue) are dealt with in an instrumental manner, the normative alignment with 
EU norms and practices more broadly has not led to any movement away from the EU arena 
as the main foreign policy provider for Cyprus. Importantly, we also demonstrate how 
leadership, as a mediating factor, is important in determing the exact nature of the impact 
of crisis on foreign policy orientation. In the case of Cyprus we show how, following the 
crisis, there was a push for the strengthening of its European credentials and identity at the 
leadership level in terms of its foreign policy, in stark contrast to the societal reaction.      
Our aim is to complement and add to the sparse literature in this area through an 
exploration of the Cyprus case, which is chosen as a case study for several reasons. First, 
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Cyprus provides an interesting focus in terms of the origins, development, nature of and 
reaction to the crisis. Cyprus obtained a unique rescue package crafted by ‘the troika’ 
(European Commission, European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund) and 
had to deal with a devastating domestic banking crisis, and has been subject to intense fiscal 
pressure and reform. Furthermore, compared to other EU member states that received an 
EU bailout, Cyprus experienced an unprecedented ‘bail-in’ deal leading to high levels of 
Euroscepticism at public and party political level. At certain moments, Cyprus recorded one 
of the least positive images of the EU across all members (17 per cent, only comparable to 
Greece’s 16 per cent, Eurobarometer 2013). This Euroscepticism is striking given the 
historically high support for European integration among the public (Agapiou-Josephides 
2011, 1593) and the high degree of Europeanisation of foreign policy (see, for example, 
Sepos 2008) among elites in a country with such substantial security challenges. Finally, the 
case study of Cyprus provides us with the opportunity to provide an important empirical 
contribution to the study of Cypriot foreign policy, which remains heavily under-researched 
(with the exception of works from Ker-Lindsay 2008, 2010, 2011 and 2012 as well as  
Zackheos 2011, Sepos 2008).  
The article is divided into four sections. Section one outlines the theoretical and 
methodological approach. Section two provides a context for understanding the Eurozone 
crisis and its impact on Cyprus. Section three explores the impact of the Eurozone crisis on 
the Europeanisation of Cypriot foreign policy and assesses alternative foreign policy 
orientation. The final section draws conclusions on the implications of the Eurozone crisis on 
the Europeanisation of foreign policy in Cyprus and beyond.      
The Eurozone Crisis and the Europeanisation of National Foreign Policies   
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As already alluded to, this article is not focusing on the impact of the EU on national foreign 
policy but rather the impact of the Eurozone crisis on norms and policies of Europeanisation 
in foreign affairs. What we are interrogating, is how events such as the Eurozone crisis 
interrupt, disrupt or reverse existing foreign policy Europeanisation orientation. Thus, the 
question we are posing is not typically linear, i.e. that of asking why and how national 
foreign policy elites incorporate EU foreign policy norms, practices and procedures. It is 
rather more complex, seeking to understand how the Eurozone crisis (the policy problem) 
has led to potential reorientation by elites in relation to the existing Europeanisation of their 
foreign policy (outcomes in another policy area).  
Theoretically and methodologically this entails being clear about two aspects: first, how we 
define Europeanisation in order to ensure it remains useful (Moumoutzis 2011, p610); and 
second, on the way in which we can capture and explain the impact of the Eurozone crisis 
on Europeanised foreign policy norms and policies at the domestic level. This is complex, in 
particular as the existing literature has identified the intergovernmental foreign policy area 
as ‘unique’ with the effects of Europeanisation less easily discerned (Major, 2005, p. 182; 
Smith, 2008, p. 17). In this sense, we treat EU foreign policy as an area in where the 
intergovernmental method of governance dominates, and where the effects of the EU are 
considered to be more voluntary and non-hierarchical.  
Whilst there are many definitions of Europeanisation in the literature (e.g. Ladrech 1994; 
Risse et al 2001; Olsen 2002; Radaelli 2004), on the first aspect we follow Moumoutzis 
(2011, p612; see also Exadaktylos 2012; Moumoutzis and Zartaloudis 2015) in arguing for a 
definition that incorporates change, allows an assessment of Europeanisation at the 
domestic level which has been the result of coordinated facilitation (reflecting the non-
binding nature of EU foreign policy decisions and reflecting that Europeanisation is possible 
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without EU laws), and ‘allows researchers to demarcate a set of empirically manageable 
phenomena’ not captured by other concepts. Europeanisation is thus refined through an 
adaptation of Radaelli’s definition (2003, pp. 30-31), as “a process of incorporation in the 
logic of domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, political structures and public 
policies of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing 
things’ and shared beliefs and norms that are first defined in the EU policy processes”. This 
definition allows us to focus on a single direction of causality and to isolate a set of 
phenomena for analysis.  
 
On the second aspect, we establish the causal significance of the Eurozone crisis 
(independent variable) on EU foreign policy norms and policies at the domestic level 
through an approach outlined in the literature which seeks to provide for a more systematic 
analysis of cause and effect in examining the impact of binding or non-binding stimuli 
(Moumoutzis 2011, 2012; Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2012; Moumoutzis and Zartaloudis 
2015). Our first step is to identify whether and how Europeanisation has occurred in Cyprus 
in relation to foreign policy. This will enable us to then identify the nature of any change as a 
result of the Eurozone crisis, focusing on leadership as a mediating factor and foreign policy 
orientation in order to ensure the phenomena under scrutiny remain manageable and 
relevant. We utilise process tracing, assisted by analysis of semi-structured interviews, in 
order to achieve this. In terms of process tracing we use three intervening steps: 
Identification of the policy problem (Eurozone crisis); impact on national foreign policy 
norms and policies; consideration of alternative policies by national elites, in particular 
Cypriot Presidents. Interview questions utilised were framed in order to reflect these 
analytical steps and importantly, make explicit the line of causation from one policy area 
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(Eurozone crisis) to another (foreign policy) and to explore the effects the Eurozone crisis 
has had on foreign policy (re) orientation. Interview evidence was thus used to verify causal 
evidence found through process tracing, and identify foreign policy issues that elites 
considered were relevant in the context of any (re) orientation. This is important in the 
sense that ‘foreign policy’ cases were not pre-selected for examination but rather identified 
through empirical investigation.    
A final issue that remains is that of how we explain (causal mechanisms) any observable 
change in relation to national foreign policy (re) orientation as a direct cause of the 
Eurozone crisis. Numerous Europeanisation mechanisms have been explored in the 
literature which will allow us to be precise about what one should observe in order to 
substantiate any hypothesised explanation (Moumoutzis and Zartaloudis 2015, p. 3). We will 
focus on instrumental and socialisation mechanisms and elite actors and their actions to 
identify change. We do so in order to ensure manageability and because they are the most 
appropriate mechanisms in this instance given that we are not focusing on the European 
level per se (where mechanisms such as peer pressure might also have been appropriate). In 
this article we are explaining the extent to which foreign policy means and objectives have 
changed because of the Eurozone crisis; so the question becomes one of how EU-level 
interactions relating to the crisis (in particular austerity measures and bailout packages) - 
have led national leaders and foreign policy elites in Cyprus to reconsider, alter or confirm 
their orientation. The answer to this question will depend on the type of learning that has 
previously occurred in relation to foreign policy Europeanisation and indeed how national 
leaders and foreign policy elites have reacted to the crisis measures imposed on Cyprus.   
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The literature suggests that if change occurs through instrumental learning then it is likely to 
lead to reorientation in terms of policy instruments rather than policy objectives – that is, it 
will lead to first or second order change (Hall 1993) but will not be transformative. Similarly, 
if change occurs through social learning then it is likely to lead to reorientation in policy 
objectives and goals – that is, third order change that will be transformative. For us, this 
puzzle is more complex as we have alluded to – as we are working across two policy areas to 
establish causality and identify and explain change. Thus whilst we contextualise and define 
the policy problem as the Eurozone crisis – this is not what we are seeking to explain in 
terms of Europeanisation – rather we test our explanatory mechanisms through an analysis 
of national foreign policy change. The Eurozone crisis is the independent variable and 
national foreign policy is the dependent variable.   
Based on the above conceptual premise, we can thus expect to observe the following:  
a. Where there is evidence of Europeanisation through social learning in the national 
foreign policy of Cyprus, and EU norms are embedded in national foreign policy 
objectives and practice, there is a higher likelihood of no change or changes in policy 
instruments rather than transformation in policy goals because of the Eurozone 
crisis; this is because we hypothesise that social learning processes result in much 
‘deeper’ Europeanisation. 
b. Where there is evidence of Europeanisation through instrumental learning in the 
national foreign policy of Cyprus, and EU norms are not embedded in national 
foreign policy objectives and practice, there is higher likelihood for substantive 
change towards change in policy goals because of the Eurozone crisis; this is because 
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we hypothesise that processes of instrumental learning lead to a less transformative 
and persistent Europeanisation. 
A final issue that also needs clarification beyond our explanatory mechanisms is that of how 
we treat national foreign policy elites and leadership. Leadership is considered as a core 
intervening variable in this article which can cut across our general propositions (and 
mechanisms). Indeed, the nature of EU foreign policy decision making means that EU-
induced changes in foreign policy often depend on the conviction, resources and knowledge 
of national policy-makers and elites (Bulmer and Radaelli 2005, 7; Moumoutzis 2012, 242). 
Thus, although the impact of the Eurozone crisis on national foreign policy will depend on a 
variety of dynamics at play domestically, most important from our perspective are: i) the 
vision, ideas and beliefs of the leader ii) the extent to which these challenge EU positions, 
practices and norms. Whilst we recognise that other intervening factors and variables are 
also important in assessing the likelihood of foreign policy (re) orientation, such as the 
degree of domestic contestation for instance, this article, whilst not ignoring this entirely, 
focuses predominantly on foreign policy elites and in particular leadership in order to 
ensure manageability. 
 
The Policy Problem in Cyprus  
In order to establish the causal link between the Eurozone crisis and foreign policy 
orientation this section provides a contextual overview of the policy problem and how such 
a crisis evolved in Cyprus and the impact and responses from Cypriot elites to it. This will 
allow us to specify and explain in more detail how disruption in one area has impacted on 
(re) orientation in another.  
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Cyprus joined the EU in 2004 and within four years adopted the Euro. Both were 
instrumental political decisions that sought to promote security and stability, with Cyprus in 
good condition financially and economically when joining the Euro. The signs of potential 
economic problems in Cyprus emerged as early as 2008 when the global financial crisis 
caused a mild recession on the island leading to stagnating growth in 2009. Demetris 
Christofias and his AKEL (Progress Party of the Working People) party that came to power in 
February 2008 in the Presidential elections, increased spending to address the fiscal 
problems on the island, but the crisis in Greece in 2010 and the interconnectedness of the 
Cypriot and Greek banking sectors increased Cyprus’ vulnerability  (Orphanides 2014, pp. 3-
4; Zenios 2013). Pursuing a fiscal strategy of overspending led to the confidence of 
international lenders being damaged and subsequently, in May 2011, the loss of access to 
international capital markets for Cyprus.   
Despite the financial risk of collapse in Cyprus clearly being identified at this point, 
leadership was a critical factor in the reluctance of the Christofias government to seek EU 
assistance. As noted by the governor of the Bank of Cyprus at the time this was because ‘as 
a communist party they did not want to incur the political cost of adopting consolidation 
measures’ (The Economist, What happened in Cyprus, 2013). Thus, unlike other countries 
that had sought assistance early from the troika to resolve their problems, ‘the Cyprus 
government followed a policy of procrastination’ (Zenios, 2014, p. 3). When Cypriot banks 
were subsequently exposed and suffered severe losses following a decision by European 
leaders to write-down Greek government debt on October 2011, ‘the joint effect of public 
debt accumulation and deterioration of the banks’ balance sheet set in motion a negative 
feedback loop between banking and the public finances’ (Ibid, p.5). This added to the 
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economic (a sharp fall in GDP) and political costs emanating from the ammunition explosion 
on 11 July 2011, which destroyed a major power station on the island that produced half of 
its power supply, and for which the opposition blamed the President directly4. 
Importantly, whilst the Christofias government refused to seek help from the EU and IMF, it 
was willing to turn to Russia to finance its fiscal strategy without the necessary structural 
adjustments that would have resolved the underlying fiscal issues. The sum of 2.5 billion 
euros borrowed from Russia was a substantive amount for a country with a Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of only 17 billion euros, and for some this did not address the issue of the 
sustainability of Cypriot debt at a time when the euro area crisis was intensifying 
(Orphanides 2014, pp. 3-4, 17-18). Whilst turning to the troika was still an option in 2011 
the Christofias government ignored warnings from the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 
governor of the Bank of Cyprus, as he was not willing to accept any conditions on structural 
adjustment. This, combined with the inability to recapitalise Cypriot banks because of loss of 
market access, Parliamentary elections (May 2011) and then Presidential elections (due in 
February 2013) led to a politicisation of the crisis and thus a reluctance to accept or take any 
unpopular measures that would jeopardise re-election (Orphanides 2014, pp12-15). 
Thus, though resistant to a troika solution to the crisis in Cyprus, the government did not 
have any policy measures in place to reduce public debt even though default seemed like an 
inevitable outcome. What was also inevitable following a downgrading of Cyprus to junk 
status by three major rating agencies (Iordanidou and Athanassios 2014, p. 65), which 
rendered government debt ineligible as collateral for borrowing from the euro-system (a 
rule suspended for Greece, Portugal and Ireland but not Cyprus), was that the government 
had to approach the troika for assistance in June 2012 (Zenios 2014, p. 8). The negotiation – 
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subject to considerable delay and taking eight months (compared to one month for other 
countries) – resulted in the construction of a programme of measures and Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) in December 2012. It was subsequently agreed by the Eurogroup on 
16 March 2013 under the new President, Nicos Anastasiades – including a bail-in entailing a 
one-off levy on resident and non-resident bank deposits (6.75% for deposits under 100, 000 
euros and 9.9% thereafter), which the German government insisted on because of its own 
electoral politics (The Economist, What happened in Cyprus, 2013; Iordanidou and 
Athanassios 2014, p. 6). The aim was to use the money raised to recapitalise banks and 
write-down debt to the tune of 5.8 billion euros (Zenios 2014, p.16).   
The bail-in option was unprecedented and it was not an official EU policy tool at the time (it 
was incorporated as part of Directive 2014/59). Nor was it officially considered as an option 
by the Christofias5 government or by the Anastasiades government that followed - the latter 
in particular considered to have had no choice but to accept due to pressure from other 
European leaders (Zenios 2014, p.15). The Cypriot Parliament rejected the original proposal 
amid public outcry and widespread protests, but alternatives put forward by various groups 
and academics were rejected or ignored (see Iordanidou and Athanassios 2014, p6-7) . Thus 
the Anastasiades government at the Eurogroup meeting that followed on the 24-25 March, 
accepted a deal in which the Cyprus Popular Bank (CPB) was liquidated with covered 
deposits, its emergency liquidity assistance and associated collateral, transferred to the 
largest bank in Cyprus - the Bank of Cyprus, which would subsequently be restructured. The 
immediate economic consequences of such an agreement proved to be dire – GDP declined 
by 5.9% in the last quarter of 2013, and unemployment increased to 16.9%. 
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Whilst more recent figures indicate the seeds of a recovery in Cyprus, its path is very slow 
and the EU remains unpopular among the Cypriot public for the economic structural 
changes imposed on Cyprus, and in particular the one-off levy that was deemed to be 
‘unfair’ and was certainly unprecedented (Zenios 2014, p. 24). The crisis in Cyprus led to 
President Christofias and his successor, President Anastasiades, turning to Russia for 
financial assistance; the former more successful than the latter, and the latter less to do 
with ideology than desperation. At the same time, Cyprus developed a new agenda of 
cooperation with states outside the EU, in particular in energy matters.  
Such moves raise the question of what impact, if any, this had on Cypriot foreign policy and 
in particular Cyprus’ European foreign policy orientation and identity? But, before we do 
that and in order to be able to reflect on potential changes, it is first important to 
summarise the Europeanisation of Cypriot foreign policy before the crisis, in line with our 
analytical steps outlined in section two.     
The Europeanisation of Foreign Policy in pre-Crisis Cyprus  
In the case of Cyprus, Europeanisation has historically reflected a tension between 
upholding its normative values and securing its national interests.  The Europeanisation of 
the Cyprus problem and the Cypriot application to join the EU in 1990 was primarily 
underpinned by instrumental calculation rather than a normative affinity with the EU’s 
values. Security concerns caused by the division of the island were the primary reason and 
this was a continuation of the strategy of internationalisation pursued by the Cypriot 
government historically (Joseph 1999). Both before and in particular after membership, 
Cyprus found its closest ally in Greece, in its attempts to influence the parameters of the 
Cyprus problem6.   
13 
 
When Cyprus joined the EU on 1 May 2004 under a government led by nationalist President, 
Tassos Papadopoulos (of the right wing DIKO party), the approach taken was 
confrontational (Passas and Katakalou 2012, 30-31) and underpinned by an instrumental 
logic (Sepos 2008, 133). Although new Commission policy instruments (Christou 2013, Kyris 
2015) to facilitate Turkish Cypriot development were constructed once Cyprus joined, a 
distinct national logic of trying to limit them or their implementation still prevailed – driven 
by the instrumental approach of the Cypriot President. The election of Demetris Christofias 
in February 2008 (of AKEL, the Communist Party) did not witness any change in the way in 
which EU opportunity structures were utilised to influence the parameters of the national 
problem7. The only major difference was the more pragmatic as opposed to confrontational 
approach taken by Papadopoulos. This is not an area where Cypriot governments, whatever 
the leadership, ideology and party affiliation, acquiesced to EU Member States and EU 
institutional requests for compromise in all areas. Any incorporation of EU constructed 
instruments relating to Turkish Cypriots, were implemented through the dominant national 
logic and parameters for a solution to the Cyprus problem. If new instruments contravened 
such logic they were rejected, as exemplified by the refusal of the Cypriot government to 
endorse or agree on the Direct Trade Regulation (DTR) (Christou 2013). 
Under Papadopoulos, although slow in recognising the need for a more dynamic 
institutional and administrative system of management for European affairs (Passas and 
Katakalou 2012, 31), including foreign policy, there was a high degree of functional 
convergence and normative policy adaptation and alignment that signified a step-change 
with previous national foreign policy practice and orientation. For example, a major change 
in foreign policy objectives was the Cypriot decision to withdraw itself from the non-aligned 
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movement on joining the EU. In addition to this Cyprus joined other ESDP institutions 
including the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European Union Institute for Strategic 
Studies (ISS), the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) and the European Security and 
Defence College (ESDC). In general, Cyprus aligned itself with most EU CFSP positions in the 
Papadopoulos era, with very few exceptions (e.g. the recognition of Kosovo, even though it 
agreed to the creation of the EULEX mission) (Ker-Lindsay 2011, 113).   
Yet, EU membership under Papadopoulos and also Christofias did not lead to further 
internationalisation in the form of NATO membership for Cyprus, precisely because of 
strategic national interest calculations; only Cyprus and Malta did not join of those countries 
that became part of the EU in 2004. There was a fundamental and general mistrust of NATO 
because of the long-standing membership of Turkey within the organisation (since 1952); 
and the perception therefore that it was biased towards Turkey and its interests (Ker-
Lindsay 2011, 114; Sepos 2008, 133). Indeed, for AKEL (Christofias’ party), there was no 
interest in either the Partnership for Peace (PfP) or NATO – even though during the period 
when Christofias was in office this position was increasingly contested by other political 
parties; in particular the main opposition centre-right Democratic Rally party (DISY)) that 
whilst sceptical of full membership, favoured joining the PfP programme (Ibid). In this 
instance then, despite domestic political contestation between parties, NATO was not 
considered to be a critical platform for the pursuit of Cypriot strategic interests by the 
leadership; nor was participation in NATO programmes considered important from a 
normative perspective with regards to the EU level. Membership of the EU was clearly not 
enough to alter the external identity of Cyprus towards a platform that was perceived as a 
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threat to the national interest. The perceived strategic cost was greater than any perceived 
benefit.  
Finally, the Christofias government established new, innovative institutional and 
administrative mechanisms for coordinating EU affairs and projecting Cypriot positions in 
Brussels. For example, the most innovative was the establishment of the Secretariat (of the 
Cyprus Presidency of the EU), the Director of which reported directly to the President of the 
Republic. In addition, European Affairs units were established in all ministries (Feb 2010) to 
manage EU affairs within and across ministries internally and externally with regard to 
coordination with the Representation in Brussels (for details see Passas and Katakalou 2012, 
32-33). These institutional developments also denote a ‘turn to Europe’ and a domestic 
procedural Europeanisation of foreign policy. In this regard, whilst Christofias clearly 
resisted and indeed rejected many of the neoliberal solutions suggested for Cyprus when 
the crisis 'hit home’, he was normatively and procedurally aligned in other areas, including 
EU CFSP objectives. This tension, however, also meant that Christofias was also willing to 
look to alternative partners, such as Russia, in order to address the impact of the financial 
crisis, as we discussed earlier.  
What we can summarise from this short overview of Cypriot foreign policy Europeanisation 
is that whilst Cyprus has gradually learnt to ‘play the game‘ and has incorporated EU CFSP 
norms and objectives – that is, there has been clear convergence between Cypriot foreign 
policy goals and those of the EU at a macro level – foreign policy issues (derived from Cyprus 
or discussed in the Council) that are sensitive to the national interest (the Cyprus problem, 
Kosovo) have been treated in a more instrumental manner. Thus, in the words of one 
diplomat, ‘You might see some differences between…presidents, but the overall framework 
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does not change’ (Interview, Cypriot diplomat, Brussels, September 2013).  This, however, is 
not to undermine a certain, parallel normative alignment, especially during the 
Papadopoulos Presidency.   
As a result, our propositions in section two in this instance need further nuancing – and 
based on this evidence – exceptions aside (as we can expect little change here) - we might 
expect the impact of the Eurozone crisis to lead to the search for instrumental alternatives 
to address the crisis, but through new bilateral relationships or instruments that coalesce 
rather than work against broader EU foreign policy objectives and norms. That is, precisely 
because of the normative underpinnings of Europeanisation in Cyprus, we would expect a 
resistance to any transformative change. Furthermore, because there are very few 
exceptions with regards to Cypriot foreign policy alignment and learning, we would expect 
to see not third order change but continued instrumentalism within the EU in dealing with 
such issues, in particular related to – directly or indirectly - the national problem. As we shall 
see in the next section, the extent to which the Eurozone crisis has impacted orientation 
also depends on how far decisions taken in relation to national foreign policy affect Cyprus’ 
economic opportunities in times of crisis.   
Impact of the Eurozone Crisis and Alternatives 
For all the public disillusionment caused by the financial crisis (Eurobarometer 2013), and 
the turn to Russia financially, the leadership in Cyprus, in particular once Anastasiades was 
elected in February 2013, sought to remedy this not through a (de) Europeanisation of 
foreign policy, but rather deeper and wider alignment with the European foreign policy 
milieu. Thus, whilst the ‘EU crisis was considered brutal, it did not have an impact on Cyprus 
policy…the main patterns of foreign policy did not change and Cyprus remained EU-
17 
 
oriented’ (Telephone Interview, Cypriot diplomat, Brussels, April 2014). Moreover, ‘the 
severe financial crisis…affected the exercise of foreign policy but not in terms of substance 
or orientation.…the new Government…adopted a more EU-centric attitude…even though… 
[the government was] more sensitive on issues that have economic impact’ (Telephone 
Interview, Cypriot diplomat, Nicosia, August 2014; our emphasis). How, then, can this be 
explained, given the turn to Russia for financial assistance and in particular given the 
widespread belief among Cypriot elites as well as the public that the troika programme and 
bail-in was fundamentally unjust and unfair in nature?  
At one level it can be explained precisely because of the instrumentality within which 
Cypriot foreign policy elites perceived the importance of the EU for leverage in resolving the 
Cyprus problem. The Cyprus problem is front and centre of all Cypriot foreign policy 
engagement and objectives. In this sense the cost of moving away from Europeanisation 
and the EU and seeking alternative alliances would reduce the power of a small state such 
as Cyprus to pursue its main goal – the resolution of the Cyprus problem. For one Cypriot 
diplomat, ‘Cyprus is a small country, with little influence, so we rely on the institutional 
structures of the EU’ whilst others also highlighted that the crisis actually meant that 
‘people (in the EU) now hear Cyprus when we talk about Turkey or other [security] issues, 
and this is an added value’ (Interviews, Cypriot diplomats, Nicosia/Brussels, September 
2013/April 2014).  
Thus the EU platform allowed Cyprus to protect its strategic national interests in relation to 
the Cyprus problem, and to prevent the imposition of ‘red line’ policies such as the DTR 
being agreed and implemented in Cyprus. The crisis, in this sense, did not have a direct 
bearing on Cypriot foreign policy (for elites at least) relating to the national problem. Whilst 
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there was a severe and painful financial cost, the benefits of membership far outweighed 
the cost of any potential alternatives; reorientation away from the EU platform included the 
risk of loosing the credibility, power and voice to maintain leverage and ensure its national interests 
were protected – in particular in relation to Turkish conditionality.     
However, whilst such an explanation is certainly convincing, especially given the centrality of 
the Cyprus problem, we must also capture the broader indirect and leadership effects of the 
crisis on Cypriot foreign policy Europeanisation, which cuts across the mechanisms of 
instrumental but also social (normative) learning. Instrumental learning does not explain 
fully the increased enthusiasm for more EU in terms of practices and procedural norms and 
indeed more alignment with the West given the heavy costs imposed on Cypriot society 
during the crisis; and it also ignores the ‘embedded rationalism’ (Jacoby 2004) of the Cypriot 
approach in relation to the Cyprus problem, i.e. that EU norms and practices such as 
conditionality in the Turkish accession process were welcome additional instruments at 
national level.  
Turning, therefore, to leadership, one Cypriot official noted that the ‘crisis was not a 
determinant factor in foreign policy [orientation]…the change of government was’, going on 
to emphasise that ‘Anastasiades wanted to be more mainstream European and had a vision 
to come closer to Euro-Atlantic structures and more specifically to apply for joining [NATO’s} 
partnership for peace, which was an anathema for the Christofias government. This was 
well-received as marking a new direction for Cyprus’ (Telephone Interview, Cypriot 
diplomat, Brussels, April 2014). Indeed the normative predisposition of Anastasiades – 
despite increasing public frustration with the EU - not just towards EU and Western security 
structures but also the structural reforms required in Cyprus, can explain more fully why 
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whilst there were possible foreign policy ‘alternatives…for example Russia, Israel and the 
US…’ there was no real choice but to remain inside and politically committed because 
Cyprus ‘shared the same ideas as the EU…and for this reason we did not see other 
alternatives’(Ibid). Indeed, additional engagement with other countries was not conceived 
as an alternative rather it was seen ‘as a natural development [after the gas findings], which 
does not contradict EU policies…this is similar with Russia and China’ (Ibid).  Beyond this, the 
fact that Anastasiades’ Foreign Minister, Ioannis Kasoulides, had been a former MEP made 
him more amenable to adapting and orientating Cypriot foreign policy towards EU norms 
and goals.   
Such a predisposition clearly had an impact on Cypriot national foreign policy elites and the 
way in which the EU foreign policy platform was utilised procedurally and in terms of 
practice. There was more appreciation of the strengths of the collective, consensual 
approach inside the EU; and Cypriot diplomats aligned themselves with EU Member States 
even where there was instrumental reasons not to do so.  For example, Cyprus chose to 
work collectively with EU Member States on Libya. In addition, agreeing to sanctions within 
the EU against Iran was clearly against Cypriot strategic interests; it meant the deregistering 
of Iranian companies affected by sanctions, from Cyprus, and more importantly, that all 
trade and investment would be rerouted through Turkey, increasing its power in the region. 
Thus domestic normative alignment to the EU position was the primary consideration and 
was viewed as more appropriate and constructive for Cyprus than acting strategically within 
the EU milieu (Telephone Interview, Greek Cypriot official, Nicosia, March 2014). This was 
more difficult under Christofias because of his ideological stance on Western security 
20 
 
structures such as NATO and indeed his opposition to the imposition of a neoliberal solution 
on the crisis in Cyprus.  
The normative predisposition of Anastasiades towards the EU is also critical in 
understanding the link between the crisis and Cyprus’ relations with Russia8. Christofias 
secured a £2.5 billion loan to ease Cypriot liquidity problems caused by the crisis; but 
subsequent events had important consequences domestically for Russian as well as Cypriot 
bank deposits. When Anastasiades came to power he faced a difficult dilemma: there was a 
large Russian community in Cyprus and Russia was a staunch supporter of Cyprus in the UN 
Security Council in relation to the Cyprus problem. However, a lack of any credible 
alternative to the EU, added to Anastasiades commitment to neoliberal ‘structural’ 
economic reform domestically9 meant he accepted a 'painful yet, given the circumstances, 
the best agreement that they could secure' (Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus 2013).  
When the issue of sanctions against Russia was discussed in the Council for its actions in 
Ukraine, this created tension between Cyprus’ normative procedural alignment with the EU 
and its broader national goals and interests relating to the Cyprus problem and its future 
financial interests that would rely on continued Russian investment. Here the two 
explanatory mechanisms are not mutually exclusive in explaining Cyprus’ stance. The new 
commitment to align further with the EU objective of imposing sanctions meant that 
instrumental interests had to align within such a commitment ‘to retain our credibility and 
support decisions of the EU, while making clear that Russia needs to remain a strategic 
partner of the EU and that sanctions that cost member states are to be avoided’ (Interview, 
Greek Cypriot official, Brussels, March 2014). Similarly, Cyprus ‘voted yes in the General 
Assembly [which condemned the Russian annexation of Crimea] and this was to align with 
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EU foreign policy’ (Interview, Greek Cypriot official, April 2014). It was also, however, an 
instrumental decision related to upholding the principle of territorial integrity10 in the 
context of the Cyprus problem (Interview, EEAS official, November 2015) and the seccession 
of Turkish Cypriots as well as the role of Turkey in the north part of Cyprus.  
Away from the Cyprus problem it was strategic interests linked to the energy agenda, rather 
than any sense of EU-normative alignment that led to the Cypriot government’s immediate 
recognition of the post-Morsi Egyptian government (July 2013) prior to any announcement 
on an EU common position by the European External Action Service (EEAS) (Telephone 
Interview, Cypriot diplomat, Nicosia,  September 2013).  More broadly on energy, the crisis 
gave impetus to Cyprus’ energy agenda as an avenue for revitalising the Cypriot economy 
through bilateral alliances, but importantly, within EU energy security objectives and 
through utilising EU policy initiatives and instruments (Cyprus Mail 2013; Interview, Greek 
Cypriot official, Brussels, April 2014). This can be explained through the instrumental need 
to maximise the exploitation of the opportunities offered by its Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) for Cyprus, but also Europe more broadly in the long term in terms of energy security. 
Thus whilst it can be argued that the instrumental logic dominates in its energy calculus – 
precisely because of its importance to Cyprus’ economic future - such a calculus is not seen 
as exclusive, as Cyprus is keen to develop its energy agenda within the bounds of the EU’s 
normative energy framework. Furthermore the EU is perceived as a critical facilitator and 
politico-security actor in relation to its energy agenda – in particular given Turkish 
objections to Cypriot exploration of its EEZ – but also through the instruments that it offers 
Cyprus to capitalise on its energy opportunities (Interview, Greek Cypriot official, March 
2014).   
22 
 
Conclusions 
Using a case study of Cyprus, and focusing primarily on foreign policy elites (leaders), this 
article has traced the causal significance of the Eurozone crisis on practices of 
Europeanisation in the foreign policy realm; with a particular focus on revealing its impact 
on reorienting foreign policy. This is a topic that has not received the academic or policy 
attention that it deserves in comparison to other policy areas (with the exceptions noted), 
and our findings have multiple and important implications.  
In terms of explaining the impact, it is clear that our mechanisms are not mutually exclusive 
and must be nuanced to the capture the complexity of the Cyprus case. Thus, in accordance 
with our proposition on social learning – there was an (albeit gradual) level of normative 
convergence and embedding of EU CFSP norms within Cypriot national foreign policy 
practice. Similarly - and conversely - we have shown that in areas of national sensitivity – 
and in particular the national (Cyprus) problem and issues related directly or indirectly to 
this (Kosovo) – Cypriot leaders have been consistently instrumental in protecting the Cypriot 
interest. This has involved refusing to agree to EU institutional proposals relating to the 
Turkish Cypriots, not aligning to EU positions on issues such as Kosovo, not to mention 
utilising the EU arena to ensure that Turkey complies with EU protocols, but more 
importantly, to maintain leverage with regards to resolving the Cyprus problem within 
agreed international parameters.      
What then of the impact of the Eurozone crisis and the role of leadership? We have 
revealed that in the above context – which resembles that of Jacoby’s ‘embedded 
rationalism’ (2004), where the two mechanisms are not easily separable but are rather 
intertwined – leadership under Anastasiades was critical in explaining more ‘Europe’ after 
23 
 
the crisis hit home. Whilst Christofias and indeed Papadopoulos were not averse to general 
convergence in relation to CFSP norms and objectives, they were staunchly against more 
Europe and integration into Western security structures such as NATO – mainly because of 
Turkish membership. When the crisis impacted on Cyprus, Christofias was clearly against 
any troika solution in the financial sense; but his turn to Russia was related to his underlying 
beliefs. The loan secured from Russia then, was an instrumental means to finding an 
alternative way (or buying more time to avoid the inevitable for some) of addressing the 
financial problems Cyprus faced; but this did not affect his overall commitment to EU CFSP 
norms. Thus there was a fundamental tension between these two areas with regards to 
Europeanisation.  
Under Anastasiades this tension somewhat dissipated. That is, whilst he was clearly not 
supportive of the severity of the troika solution to the Cyprus crisis, he was more 
normatively predisposed to neoliberal restructuring of the Cypriot economy. This, alongside 
his support more generally for Western security structures – and the disconnect between 
the public and foreign policy decision-making we can argue, is a critical factor in explaining 
why the reaction to the crisis in terms of foreign policy orientation was to pursue more EU. 
This is not to argue that under Christofias this would not have happened – but rather to 
assert that the change in leadership was significant in Cyprus seeking to actively pursue – 
and indeed accelerate - its economic and foreign policy future through greater integration 
with EU norms and practice. Again we cannot argue given the evidence that 
instrumentalism is not important in continuing to explain certain foreign policy decisions or 
new bilateral orientations and instruments under Anastasiades during and after the crisis.  
But we have shown that any such instrumentalism during and after the crisis has been 
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pursued not as an alternative to the EU but rather as a means of securing Cypriot national 
interests through embedding Cyprus further into EU foreign policy and external policy 
norms. Moreover, the Cyprus case has demonstrated the critical significance of the link 
between economic recovery and foreign policy orientation under Anastasiades; to the 
degree that third order change away from the EU was never considered as a normatively 
credible or desirable alternative for the security and future prosperity of Cyprus.  
Finally there are broader implications that can be extrapolated from the Cypriot experience. 
First, further comparative research must be done on the relationship between crisis, 
democracy and foreign policy orientation in and across Europe (within and beyond the 
Mediterranean). Given the focus of this article we were not able to delve into the broader 
societal and policy dynamics of crisis and the impact that this might have on alternative 
foreign policy orientation; in Cyprus the evidence suggests a disconnect between the foreign 
policy elites and society and thus minimal impact, but it would be interesting to explore this 
further and the implications this has for EU foreign policy learning and integration in the 
future. Second, the case of Cyprus points to a certain broad resilience in foreign policy 
orientation towards the EU despite the severity of any economic or financial crisis; further 
work, however, remains to be done on how the medium and longer term effects of crisis 
and political marginalisation rupture patterns of Europeanisation and the conditions under 
which such ruptures lead to third order transformative change. Leadership was an 
important normative driver (intervening variable) for pursuing more foreign policy 
objectives through the EU at a general level albeit through an instrumental lens in relation 
to the Cyprus problem – and indeed, as revealed during the crisis under Anastasiades 
specifically, in terms of securing its economic future.   
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Endnotes  
                                                          
1See, for example, Special Issues of Review of International Political Economy, Volume 22, Issue 3, 2015, 
Journal of European Public Policy, Issue 3, 2012; Special Issue of Journal of Common Market Studies, Issue 
Supplement s1, Volume 48, 2010. 
2 To be clear, whilst we categorise the Eurozone crisis as the exogenous trigger for change, we acknowledge 
that the crisis in Cyprus was also a result of domestic macroeconomic mismanagement and decisions taken by 
the troika and EU members. 
3 See also Stavridis et al (2015) for for a discussion of crossloading in the contet of Euroepanisation and 
negative popular attitudes in the context of crisis (including in Cyprus). 
4 The explosion was caused by munitions stored at the Evangelos Florakis naval base near Zygi, Cyprus. The 
munitions, confiscated in 2009 from a Cyprus-flagged ship en route to Syria and stored in 98 containers in an 
open space at the base were left exposed to the elements - despite repeated warnings from many about the 
potential risks - until the day of the explosion. The explosion killed 13 people in total  – among which were the 
Captain of the Navy (Andreas Ioannides) and the Commander fo the base (Lambros Lambrou).  The blast 
destroyed the island’s largest power station located nearby, which in turn had a devastating impact on the 
already depressed economy. It also  meant that people in many areas of Cyprus were left without electricity. 
5 Even though the Christofias government appears to have discussed this with the ECB and troika (see Zenios 
2014, p.16) 
6 The most notable exception to this was the Annan ‘Peace’ Plan in 2004, which was supported by Greece, 
despite being rejected overwhelming by the Greek Cypriots. 
7 For detailed analysis of the structures of Cypriot foreign policy decision making in the context of the Cyprus 
problem see Ker-Lindsay (2012). See also Zackheos (2011) for a diplomatic perspective of the various phases of 
the Cyprus problem and Cyprus’s outreach immediately prior to and immediately after the accession of the 
Republic to the EU in 2004. 
8 See Christou (2011) for a fuller exploration of Cyprus-Russia bilateral relations in the EU context. 
9 Even though he did not accept the severity of what was being offered by the troika as a way to achieve this. 
10 Note we are not arguing here that Cyprus – and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - aligned closely with the EU 
on all questions of territorial integrity. The case of Abkhazia demonstrates how Cyprus has in fact adopted a 
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very pragmatic and instrumental approach that has deliberately tended to play down Russian transgressions 
despite the clear equivalence to Turkey's actions in Cyprus. Indeed the case of Abkhazia demonstrates the 
tension between Cyprus’ increased normative alignment with EU foreign policy positions and its broader 
security and economic (instrumental) interests.    
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